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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on the crash risk of US
stock market during the COVID-19 pandemic. To this end, we use the GARCH-S (GARCH with
skewness) model to estimate daily skewness as a proxy for the stock market crash risk. The
empirical results show the significantly negative correlation between EPU and stock market crash
risk, indicating the aggravation of EPU increase the crash risk. Moreover, the negative correlation
gets stronger after the global COVID-19 outbreak, which shows the crash risk of the US stock
market will be more affected by EPU during the epidemic.
Keywords: COVID-19; Economic policy uncertainty; Crash risk; Skewness.
JELClassification: D80; E60; G10; G32.
1. Introduction
The economic downturn during the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a
significant decline in the stock market. Some of the previous studies have examined
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the impacts of COVID-19 epidemic on the downside risks of stock market. One of the
main conclusions is that, in general, the occurrence of COVID-19 caused a direct and
significant drop in stock prices (Baker, Bloom, Davis, Kost & Sammon et al. (2020),
Al-Awadhi, Al-Saifi, Al-Awadhi & Alhamadi (2020), Ramelli & Wagner (2020),
Zhang, Hu & Ji (2020)). While from the perspective of volatility risk, COVID-19 will
significantly increase the volatility of the stock market (Baek, Mohanty & Mina
(2020), Onali (2020), Papadamou, Fassas, Kenourgios & Dimitriou (2020)). Different
from the existing literature, this paper focuses on stock market crash risk. Mazur,
Dang & Vega (2020) and Ziemba (2020) study the US stock market crash during the
Covid-19 period. However, they treat the crash risk as the extreme downside volatility.
In our paper, following Chen, Hong & Stein (2001) and Kräussl, Lehnert & Senulytė
(2016), we measure the crash risk by using the conditional skewness of the market
return. It is a better way to simultaneously capture the asymmetry and negative
extremes of the crash risk (Kim, Li & Zhang (2011), Kim, Li & Zhang (2011b), Wen,
Xu, Ouyang & Kou (2019)). And then, we conduct an empirical analysis to consider
the impacts of the economic policy uncertainty on the crash risk of the US stock
market.
In fact, in the early days of the epidemic, the US stock market has experienced a
plunge. From Figure 1, we can see that the stock market has suffered a severe impact
from COVID-19. The S&P 500 Index plummeted by one-third in a short period: from
3380 points on February 14, 2020, to 2,237 points on March 23, 2020. Our
subsequent empirical results further confirm this intuitive conclusion that COVID-19
negatively affects stock market crash risk. We find that the severity of the epidemic,
proxied by the growth rate of the daily new confirmed cases, does have a significant
negative impact on the conditional skewness of the market return, i.e., the crash risk
of stock market. It is also consistent with Liu, Duc Huynh & Dai (2020)’s work on the
Chinese market, who find that the epidemic increases the crash risk of stock market.
However, we have noticed that although the number of daily confirmed cases in
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the United States continued to rise in the following period, stock prices gradually
returned to the level before the epidemic, and it even hit a new high in the past three
years. It shows that the severity of the epidemic alone is not enough to explain the
stock crash.
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Figure 1. Daily new confirmed cases and S&P 500 Index
We argue that one of the reasons for this situation is the reduction of uncertainty
in economic policies, which is believed to have a wide-ranging impact on economic
and financial activities (Gulen & Ion (2016), Brogaard & Detzel (2015), Dai, Xiong &
Zhou (2020), Wen, Zhao, Zhang & Hu (2019)). As we can see from Figure 2, during
the epidemic, economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and stock prices show the opposite
trend. In the early stages of the epidemic, as the uncertainty caused by COVID-19
rose sharply, stock prices have also suffered a crash. However, with the successive
government measures designed to deal with the epidemic, economic policy
uncertainty has gradually decreased, which is what we believe a fundamental reason
for the stock market rebound. In other words, we believe that the reduction of
economic policy uncertainty during the epidemic will help reduce the crash risk of
stock market. Our findings also support this hypothesis. We find that the conditional
skewness reacts negatively to the change rate of economic policy uncertainty,
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indicating that the reduction of economic policy uncertainty can effectively reduce the
crash risk of stock market. We further find that this effect only exists during the
epidemic, and it is not significant during regular periods. It may mean that the
stability of economic policies plays a more critical role in reducing the extremely
negative impact of major crisis events.
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Figure 2. Economic Policy Uncertainty and the S&P 500 Index
This paper adds to the extant literature in several ways. First, unlike existing
research related to COVID-19, which mainly involves stock market returns and
volatility, we focus our attention on the stock market crash risk. Return and volatility
are the first and second moments of return distributions, respectively, and we use
conditional skewness to measure the crash risk, thus paying attention to the third
moment of stock market returns. Second, we confirm the conclusion that COVID-19
will increase the crash risk in the US stock market, which is initially drawn by Liu,
Duc Huynh & Dai (2020) in the Chinese stock market. We further find that the
increase in the number of confirmed cases can only explain the worsening crash risk
of stock market in the early stages of the epidemic. However, it cannot explain why in
the middle and late stages, when the number of cases continues to increase, the crash
risk will decrease instead. Therefore, the third contribution of our study is that we find
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that the stability of economic policies can provide a specific explanation for this
puzzle. Our findings show that high economic policy uncertainty will increase the
crash risk of the US stock market. In contrast, low uncertainty of economic policies
can help reduce the likelihood of stock market crashes, especially during the extreme
crisis of the COVID-19 global pandemic. More importantly, this paper has important
policy implications. Just as our findings show the importance of economic policy
stability in reducing the crash risk, we suggest that when facing major crisis events,
policymakers should introduce event-response policies as soon as possible. It is
helpful to reduce the adverse effects of economic policy uncertainty.
2. Data and methodology
2.1. COVID-19 related variables
To measure the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic, we use the logarithmic
growth rate of daily confirmed cases (rCases) in the US as the proxy. The initial
dataset is from Our World in Data (https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus). We also
set a dummy variable, D_epid, to divide the whole sample into two periods: before-
and after- the epidemic. We set the value of this dummy is one after January 21, 2020,
the date when the first case of COVID-19 in the United States is confirmed, and zero
otherwise.
2.2. Economic policy uncertainty indices
We use three economic policy uncertainty related indices based on daily
newspaper coverage in the United States in our paper, all of which are proposed by
Baker, Bloom & Davis (2016) or Baker, Bloom, Davis & Terry (2020). The first
variable is the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for United States (EPU), and the
second is the Equity Market-related Economic Uncertainty Index (EMU). The third is
a proxy of COVID-induced economic uncertainty, say, Equity Market Volatility:
Infectious Disease Tracker (EMV-ID). We take the first variable as our main proxy of
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Economic Policy Uncertainty, and the other two are used in our robustness checks. In
our empirical analysis, we use the logarithmic change rate of EPU indices, so that we
get three change rates corresponding to the above indices, namely rEPU, rEMU,
rEMV-ID, respectively. If the index has a zero value, we use log(Index+1) when
calculating the logarithm. All these data are retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/).
2.3. Measuring US stock market crash risk
In our paper, following the works of Chen, Hong & Stein (2001) and Kräussl,
Lehnert & Senulytė (2016), the crash risk of the US stock market is proxied by the
conditional skewness (Skew), which is estimated from the GARCH-S (GARCH with
skewness) model. The original idea of using skewness to measure crash risk was put
forward by Chen, Hong & Stein (2001). However, they only calculate a half-a-year
horizon skewness from the daily data. To model the daily Euro crash risk, Kräussl,
Lehnert & Senulytė (2016) make use of the Gram-Charlier series expansion method to
estimate the conditional skewness. Our GARCH-S model is:
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Where tr is the logarithmic return of the S&P 500 index, retrieved from Yahoo
Finance (https://finance.yahoo.com/), and th is a classical GARCH(1,1) structure.
There are two residual forms in the model: the residual t and the standardized
residual t . 1tI  represents the information set at the time t. ts is the conditional
skewness process and it is the key part in our model. In addition to the constant term,
it consists of two parts: the autoregressive part and the lagged return shocks part.
León, Rubio & Serna (2005) and also Kräussl, Lehnert & Senulytė (2016), both of
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them use the Gram-Charlier series expansion to estimate the model. We will follow
their works, and the difference is we truncate at the third moment.
Table 1 gives the estimation results of the GARCH-S model. In general, most of
the coefficients are significant, suggesting that the model can fit the data well. We
focus on the conditional skewness process. As expected, the coefficient of the shock
to skewness is positive and significant (0.0361 with a z-statistic 7.2590) and the
coefficient of lagged skewness is also positive and significant (0.1544 with a
z-statistic 5027.295). The structure of the conditional skewness is very similar to that
in the variance case, indicating that the skewness is autocorrelated and persistent.
2.4. Descriptive statistics
All the data in our paper is daily, and the sample period is from January 2017 to
August 2020. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables we used, and all
variables are stationary.
Table 1.
Estimation results of GARCH-S model
Parameter Value Parameter Value
μ -0.0425***
(-63.90)
β0 0.0000
(0.78)
α0 0.0000***
(62.31)
β1 0.0361***
(7.2590)
α1 0.2065***
(88.01)
β2 0.1544***
(5027.2950)
α2 0.7720***
(410.62)
AIC -4.8387
Obs 917 SIC -4.8020
Log-likelihood 2232.808 HQ -4.8247
Notes: (1) ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
The z-statistics are presented in the brackets. (2) Due to the high non-linearity of the likelihood
function, we use the starting values of parameters estimated from the simple GARCH (1,1) model.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Min Max Std ADF
Skew 0.0005 -0.3257 0.2094 0.0567 -24.6753***
rCases 0.0114 -2.9444 2.9444 0.2256 -5.9381***
rEPU 0.0004 -1.7103 2.3038 0.4840 -24.6728***
rEMU 0.0007 -4.1866 4.2360 1.0065 -22.0578***
rEMV_ID 0.0034 -1.9782 1.9782 0.4591 -20.6820***
Notes: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The total
observations are 917.
2.5. Model specifications
We use the simple time series model to conduct our empirical analysis. The
dependent variable is the stock market crash risk, measured by conditional skewness
estimated from the GARCH-S model. We have two main explanatory variables. The
first is the logarithmic growth rate of daily confirmed cases, rCases, and the
logarithmic change rate of the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for the United
States, rEPU. The alternative variables for rEPU will be used in the robustness
checks. The primary model is specified as:
1
1 0
+ +
p q
t t i t i j t j t
i j
Skew c Skew rCases rEPU     
 
       (2)
where p and q will be determined by the AIC or SC information criterion.
In order to examine the potentially different roles that EPU may play during the
epidemic, we add the interaction term of D_epid and rEPU in our model:
1
1 0 0
_ + + _ +
p q q
t t i t i j t j j t j t
i j j
Skew c d D epid Skew rCases rEPU D epid rEPU       
  
            (3)
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3. Empirical results
3.1. COVID-19 and stock market crash risk
We start our empirical analysis by only considering the explanatory variable
rCases, and the results are shown in Table 3. As we expected, all the coefficient of
1trCases  is negative and significant at 1% level, indicating the severity of the
epidemic has a direct negative impact on the crash risk of the US stock market. This
finding is also consistent with Liu, Duc Huynh & Dai (2020)’s work in the Chinese
stock market.
Table 3
The effects of COVID-19 on stock market crash risk
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.0007
(0.4018)
0.0010
(0.5655)
0.0010
(0.5297)
Skew(t-1) 0.1982***
(6.1851)
0.1909***
(5.8741)
0.1918***
(5.8797)
rCases(t-1) -0.0245***
(-3.0197)
-0.0340***
(-3.4662)
-0.0345***
(-3.4816)
rCases(t-2) -0.0170*
(-1.7227)
-0.0151
(-1.3789)
rCases(t-3) 0.0037
(0.3760)
N 919 918 917
R2 0.0500 0.0528 0.0529
Adj-R2 0.0479 0.0497 0.0488
AIC -2.9505 -2.9505 -2.9474
SC -2.9347 -2.9295 -2.9211
Notes: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
The t-statistics are presented in the brackets.
3.2. Does and how does EPU matter?
We further consider the role of economic policy uncertainty in affecting the crash
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risk in this section. We first only add the explanatory variable rEPU into our model,
and the results are reported in Table 4. We can see that all the coefficients of trEPU
except that in column (4) is negative and significant at 5% level. It is consistent with
our exception that increased economic policy uncertainty will increase the possibility
of a stock market crash. In other words, improving the stability of economic policies
will help prevent a stock market crash.
When considering the influence of rCases and rEPU at the same time, we use
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz criterion (SC) to determine the
lag length of the variables. The results are shown in Table 5. Although the optimal lag
lengths obtained according to different criteria are different, the conclusion that the
severity of COVID-19 and EPU have negative influences on the crash risk of stock
market is still holding. In terms of explanatory power, when the variables rCases and
rEPU are added into the model simultaneously, its explanatory power has been
significantly improved. For example, comparing the results in the first column of
Table 5 with the results in the second column of Table 3, we can see that after adding
rEPU, the adj-R2 increases from 0.0497 to 0.0504. While comparing the results from
the second column of Table 5 with that in the first column of Table 3, the Adj-R2 has
increased from 0.0479 to 0.0502.
Table 4
The effects of EPU on stock market crash risk
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.0004
(0.2392)
0.0004
(0.2380)
0.0004
(0.2387)
0.0004
(0.2343)
Skew(t-1) 0.2032***
(6.2845)
0.2037***
(6.2869)
0.2037***
(6.2830)
0.2042***
(6.3040)
rEPU(t) -0.0089**
(-2.3390)
-0.0084**
(-1.9999)
-0.0087**
(-2.0153)
-0.0070
(-1.5786)
rEPU(t-1) 0.0012
(0.2821)
0.0005
(0.1060)
0.0030
(0.5939)
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rEPU(t-2) -0.0013
(-0.3035)
0.0027
(0.5414)
rEPU(t-3) 0.0070
(1.5728)
N 917 917 917 917
R2 0.0460 0.0461 0.0462 0.0487
Adj-R2 0.0438 0.0429 0.0420 0.0435
AIC -2.9444 -2.9423 -2.9402 -2.9407
SC -2.9286 -2.9213 -2.9139 -2.9092
Notes: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. The t-statistics are presented in the brackets.
Table 5
The effects of COVID-19 and EPU on stock market crash risk
Variables (1) (2)
Intercept 0.0010
(0.5618)
0.0007
(0.3952)
Skew(t-1) 0.1935***
(5.9587)
0.2011***
(6.2448)
rCases(t-1) -0.0335***
(-3.4234)
-0.0241***
(-2.9812)
rCases(t-2) -0.0167*
(-1.7002)
rEPU(t) -0.0086**
(-2.2788)
-0.0087**
(-2.2954)
N 917 917
R2 0.0582 0.0552
Adj-R2 0.0540 0.0521
AIC -2.9529 -2.9519
SC -2.9266 -2.9309
Notes: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The
t-statistics are presented in the brackets. The optimal lag length in column (1) is determined by the
AIC criterion, while the SC criterion determines the optimal lag length in column (2).
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Finally, we consider whether the impact of EPU on crash risk is different during
the epidemic. We know that when a crisis event occurs, the government usually needs
to formulate a series of policies to alleviate the negative impact of the crisis.
Therefore, economic policy uncertainty during the COVID-19 crisis may play a
different role from the normal period.
The relevant results are given in Table 6. We can see that the coefficients of the
interaction terms are negative and significant at the 5% level, while the coefficients of
rEPU are not significant anymore. More accurately, take the results from column (1)
for example, the coefficient of rEPU during the before-epidemic period is -0.0062
with t-statistics -1.5967 (not significant at 10% level). While during the epidemic
period, the coefficient of rEPU is -0.0408 with t-statistics=-2.8666. It indicates that in
a regular period, changes in economic policy uncertainty do not significantly affect
the risk of stock market crashes. Moreover, during the epidemic, the increase in
uncertainty caused by COVID-19 will increase the stock market crash risk. The
timely formulation of response policies can reduce this uncertainty, thereby helping to
prevent the possibility of extreme risks in the stock market.
Table 6
The different role of EPU during the epidemic
Variables (1) (2)
Intercept 0.0009
(0.4612)
0.0009
(0.4653)
D_epid -0.0011
(-0.2232)
0.0007
(0.1365)
Skew(t-1) 0.1999***
(6.2173)
0.1926***
(5.9408)
rCases(t-1) -0.0227***
(-2.7921)
-0.0324***
(-3.2291)
rCases(t-2) -0.0165
(-1.64)
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rEPU(t) -0.0062
(-1.5967)
-0.0062
(-1.5901)
D_epid* rEPU(t) -0.0345**
(-2.3417)
-0.0340**
(-2.3105)
N 917 917
R2 0.0609 0.0637
Adj-R2 0.0557 0.0575
AIC -2.9536 -2.9544
SC -2.9220 -2.9176
Notes: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
The t-statistics are presented in the brackets. We set the lag length of each variable based on
the previous results in Table 5.
3.3. Robustness results from alternative EPU indices
There are two alternative measures about EPU: rEMU and rEMV-ID,
representing the equity market uncertainties for the normal time and the pandemic
period. In this section, we use these two variables to redo our empirical analysis. The
results are reported in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively. In general, the results are
robust.
Table 7.
Robustness results from EMU
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.0007
(0.3979)
0.0010
(0.5710)
0.0009
(0.4628)
0.0009
(0.4676)
D_epid -0.0011
(-0.2324)
0.0009
(0.1803)
Skew(t-1) 0.1968***
(6.1082)
0.1890***
(5.8143)
0.1994***
(6.1919)
0.1912***
(5.8901)
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rCases(t-1) -0.0245***
(-3.0279)
-0.0343***
(-3.4989)
-0.0245***
(-3.0096)
-0.0355***
(-3.5455)
rCases(t-2) -0.0174*
(-1.7652)
-0.0190*
(-1.8824)
rEMU(t) -0.0034*
(-1.8934)
-0.0035*
(-1.9330)
-0.0023
(-1.2211)
-0.0023
(-1.2328)
D_epid* rEMU(t) -0.0146**
(-2.1462)
-0.0153**
(-2.2533)
N 917 917 917 917
R2 0.0534 0.0567 0.0583 0.0619
Adj-R2 0.0503 0.0525 0.0531 0.0557
AIC -2.9501 -2.9513 -2.9508 -2.9525
SC -2.9290 -2.9250 -2.9193 -2.9157
Notes: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The
t-statistics are presented in the brackets.
Table 8
Robustness results from EMV_ID
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.0007
(0.4020)
0.0011
(0.5735)
0.0009
(0.4625)
0.0009
(0.4672)
D_epid -0.0009
(-0.1838)
0.0011
(0.2189)
Skew(t-1) 0.1987***
(6.1635)
0.1909***
(5.8727)
0.2000***
(6.2186)
0.1919***
(5.9194)
rCases(t-1) -0.0236***
(-2.9120)
-0.0333***
(-3.3943)
-0.0208**
(-2.5268)
-0.0314***
(-3.1276)
rCases(t-2) -0.0172*
(-1.7492)
-0.0185*
(-1.8390)
rEMV_ID(t) -0.0063
(-1.5778)
-0.0064
(1.6081)
-0.0014
(-0.3116)
-0.0014
(-0.3139)
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4. Conclusions
This paper has examined the role of economic policy uncertainty in affecting the
stock market crash. we use the conditional skewness from the GARCH-S model as the
proxy for crash risk. Our findings shed new light that COVID-19 will increase the
crash risk of the US stock market. Second, we find that the increase in economic
policy uncertainty has the risk of triggering a stock market crash. However, further
evidence suggests that this effect of EPU is significant only during the epidemic. It
reminds us that proactive policies should be implemented in time during crisis events
to reduce the economic policy uncertainty, which is very important to prevent the
stock market from crashing effectively.
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